The paper consists of seven sections describing the Constitutional Court's practice in respect of freedom of expression and freedom of assembly issues. The matters covered by the paper includes challenges of the constitutionality of laws forbidding civil servants to give public statements, regulation of religious organisations public events, regulation of restricted urban areas where freedom of assembly is limited, the content-based restrictions in respect of LGBT-speech.
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. and for the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals". 7 In any case limitations should be necessary and proportionate. 8 The UN Human Rights Committee considered the case of a
Canadian teacher who was red by the Government on the grounds that he had published certain materials stirring up religious hatred. The Committee found that limitations were necessary to protect the interests of believers.
9
The Human Rights Committee in its 102 nd session adopted General Comment
No. 34, where among other issues it explained the Committee's view towards correlation between art. 18 and art.19 of the ICCPR. 10 This commentary is a good illustration of the current state of international law towards these principles.
General approach of the ECtHR towards freedom of expression and freedom of assembly
As it was highlighted above, Russia is a party to the European Convention on Humna Rights (hereinafter the ECHR). Cases where fundamental rights to freedom of assembly and freedom of expression were discussed by the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter the ECtHR) separately or together are quite often.
The Court in every case has to apply the following criteria: the interference must be prescribed by law, 11 it must ful l a legitimate aim, 12 the interference must be necessary in a democratic society, 13 and the interference must be proportionate.
14
As it concerns, freedom of expression (including freedom of the press, freedom of artistic expression) and freedom of assembly, which are considered as deeply connected, the Court established the following:
15
The Court "must determine whether the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify the interference were "relevant and su cient", and whether the measure taken was "proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued";
16
The Court takes into account the role which the press has in a democratic society, the role of "public watchdog", contribution of the press into political But in both cases the Court took the position of protecting religions per se.
31
The Court departed from protection of religious freedom and moved out of the conventional frames towards protection of religious feelings. In conclusion of this paragraph we have to admit that at the international level, including the level of the Council of Europe there are certain standards in respect of freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. These standards are applicable towards the con ict between these rights and interests of the others or public order. Because of the practical reasons international tribunals and other instruments of human rights protection leave to the states wide margin of appreciation which national judiciary deals with. In the next paragraphs we will discuss the practice of the Constitutional Court of Russia and re ection of these international principles in its case-law.
Freedom of expression
In 2011 the Constitutional Court considered the complaint of the citizens who challenged constitutionality of laws forbidding civil servants to give public statements, evaluations and to estimate activities of state bodies or their heads in the media, when it was not within their competence. In case of violation of this provision an employee shall be subjected to o cial dismissal. As it was stressed in the media, such a ban to some extent was caused by spreading of the Internet video services, such as the U-Tube. These web-pages were utilised by some o cials who posted their revelatory videos describing the state of a airs in the departments where they were serving (the newspaper "Kommersant", 118, Law enforcement decisions which provoked the appeal to the Constitutional Court in case if they were adopted on the basis of the contested law, interpreted di erently than the Court's interpretation, shall be subjected to review. This decision of the Constitutional Court is of great importance for the ordinary courts, which have to move away from formalism in consideration of disputes on dismissal for public criticism of the authorities, and have to seek the objective truth. The courts need to act in such a way which shows the ne line that separates unauthorised slander and disloyalty from a legitimate expression in the lawful form.
Freedom of Assembly
In 2012, the Constitutional Court reviewed the complaint of the Commissioner for Human Rights (the Federal Ombudsman) concerning the Federal Law on Rallies and Regional Law (the Republic of Tatarstan) on Freedom of conscience.
The Ombudsman lodged the complaint protecting the religious organization "Jehovah's Witnesses". 34 The organisation was ned for not having informed the authorities of the municipality about its religious meeting. This meeting was held not in the prayer house of the said organisation but in one of the public buildings of the city, which had been rented by the organisation. Both the Federal and the Regional laws prescribe that the rules of holding rallies are fully applicable to any religious meetings if they are held outside the places of worship, as well as outside cemeteries or hospitals where certain rituals are performed. In particular, the contested legislative provisions oblige to notify the municipality about an upcoming religious gathering.
What is the purpose of this regulation From the rst sight it is unclear why should the municipality be noti ed if a religious organisation conducts a public event in a rented space situated not in a private but in a public building. In a multi-religious country the aim of such provisions is that the municipality must be aware of the upcoming meeting to assess whether to take steps to ensure security and order in the area of the event. However, it is not always when religious meetings are held in conditions which require mandatory adoption of preventive measures. For example, they may be held outside the places of worship, not in the municipal buildings, but in private houses.
Therefore, the Constitutional Court declared that the disputed laws do not contradict the Constitution of the Russian Federation. This is so to the extent that they introduce (as a general rule) the noti cation procedure in respect extent applicable to prayer and religious meetings, procedures for holding rallies, demonstrations and marches to the extent applicable without distinction between religious meetings, which may require the public authorities to take measures to ensure public order and safety, and those religious meetings which does not involve such a necessity.
Interrelation of freedom of expression and freedom of assembly
Abovementioned examples of freedom of expression and freedom of assembly cases were considered as their own, outside of any relationship between them.
Now we consider the situation where these freedoms are realised one through another, namely: freedom of expression of citizens is realised through meetings, marches, demonstrations, pickets. As the Constitutional Court case law shows con icts over freedom of assembly were not associated with restrictions on the expression of certain opinions as such, while processions, rallies, and demonstrations exist for expression of an opinion on a particular political issue.
In other words, the di culties in conducting meetings occurred not because of the content of the problems submitted for public discussion, but because of the technical conditions of such meetings. Opposition groups of citizens often challenge organisational modalities of the meetings. And this is a manifestation of these opposition views against the power of the government, which, in their opinion, has established such rules which are disproportionate and unreasonable.
In several press publications the position of some opposition leaders, who were encouraging "instead of protesting against a speci c issue" "just gather", was considered as the non-constructive one ("Literary Gazette" 39 (6293) of 6
October 2010). 1296-O dismissed the appeal, stating that the law obliges the executive authority, in case when they have a reasonable expectation that a public event could violate legal restrictions, to warn the organiser of a public event about it. The Constitutional Court emphasised that the applicant was not denied the right to organise a procession. Since the selected place is situated within the protected territory, the applicant was asked to communicate with the agency responsible for the maintenance of the protective regime of this area about the conduct of a public event there.
The second block of the Constitutional Court decisions is not bound to the "forbidden" or "regime" territories, but it is devoted to the debates over coordination In addition, the Constitutional Court has made guidelines regarding the timing for consideration of such disputes. It is crucial for the organisers of the meeting to hold their event on a speci c date where the event as such is reasonable if it is con ned to a speci c holiday or a memorial day. Therefore, the Constitutional Court has expressly stated that judicial review of such cases should be conducted as soon as possible, as provided for dispute resolution in the eld of electoral rights, i.e., before the date of the scheduled public event.
The Constitutional Court stressed that otherwise the judicial protection would be signi cantly weakened.
The third block of the Constitutional Court decisions re ects other con icts around the rules governing the technical organisation of meetings. Application of the law on meetings identi ed the problem of ful lling the time requirements for the appropriate applications for public gatherings. The law establishes a speci c period of time when one can ll a notice of a public event (no earlier than 15 and no later than 10 days before the alleged date of the event). However, with regard to regulation of public holidays, as well as by-laws regulating the process of ling of such noti cations, in reality there were insurmountable obstacles for public events. Such obstacles take place when the deadline for the notice of the public event is during non-working holidays.
In respect of this problem the Constitutional Court adopted the Judgement of 13 th May, 2014 41 , in which it noted: the parameters of public events, including its form, timing and venue are subjected to change and adjustment only within the framework of conciliation between the organiser and competent public The next example concerns disputes over alleged inconsistencies in a number of participants in a public event as it was suggested by the organisers of the event and an actual number of participants. In identifying the inconsistency the organiser of the action was subjected to liability in the form of a signi cant monetary penalty. This issue was considered by the Constitutional Court, which as a result adopted its Judgement No. 12-P on 18 th May, 2012. 42 In Particular the
Constitutional Court pointed out:44
A number of participants exceeding the number which was stated in the notice of its organiser in itself is not su cient to bring him or her to administrative liability, as well as exceeding the rules of occupancy limit of the venue space in itself; may occur only when the excess of the declared number of participants of the public event and creation of a real threat to public safety and order were caused by the organiser of the public event; or when the organiser, allowing the excess of the participants, has not taken appropriate measures to limit the access of citizens to the event, and did not maintain public order and security, which led to a real threat of violation of public order and security, as well as damage to property;
Liability of the organiser for violation of the public order in case when a number of participants exceeded the number stated in the noti cation is possible only when the organiser is undoubtedly guilty.
The nal conclusion of the Constitutional Court is that the challenged statute is not unconstitutional only when abovementioned conditions are met.
Thus, the Constitutional Court de facto added its own binding instructions to the contested regulation.
Constitutional review of the proposed reform of the legislation on assemblies of 2013
The The applicants challenged the provisions which:
prohibited a person from being an organiser of a public event, if he or she was brought to administrative responsibility for o enses in the sphere of organisation of rallies twice or more times; included disproportionate administrative ne as well as the possibility of such punishment as mandatory works for violating the rules of conduct or holding of a public event, if it has led to public order violations; permitted a preliminary agitation campaign from the date of coordination of time and place of the public event with the authorities. This is not the whole list of innovations in the reform of the rules of holding rallies. There is no need to name all the provisions, since the core challenge was the new legal regime of holding rallies as such, which was much stricter than the prior one. The Constitutional Court in its Judgement signi cantly softened the severity of the contested regulations and, in fact, softened the legal regime of rallies, lowering the degree of the reform.
For example, the Constitutional Court stated that a citizen, who was twice punished for violation of the rules of conducting of the rally, has no right to act as an organiser of a new event only where the re-imposition of responsibility took place within the sentence for the o ense committed earlier that is the period of 1 year. Moreover, such a ban may not be imposed inde nitely: it is designed only for the period during which the person is considered to be punished. The
Constitutional Court noted that during this period the organiser of a public event has the right to be the initiator of such events, acting indirectly, for example, referring to the initiative to other citizens, political parties and other public associations and religious organizations. He or she is not deprived of an opportunity to take a personal part in public gatherings, including the role of the person performing administrative functions at the time of the meeting or demonstration.
was called to amend the relevant legislation, and before that the courts were allowed to reduce the penalty below the lower limit prescribed for the commission of a relevant o ense. However, the statute providing for mandatory work as a form of administrative punishment was found constitutional, with certain reservations.
Such a penalty may not be imposed for violations of the formal rules of rallies. spectrum of the issues in this area, which is related only to challenges of the constitutionality of law by the citizens and the parliamentary opposition. These are the laws, which set certain limits on freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. Nevertheless, the practice of the Constitutional Court is a mirror which re ects the most acute and urgent problems of the implementation of these
freedoms. These problems demonstrate an increased con ict level in this area.
The practice of the Constitutional Court until 2012 primarily constituted of the Court's decisions rejecting constitutional complaints. However, in the recent years the Court adopts judgements more often, considering the cases involving all stakeholders, and allowing them also to use the written procedure. This shows that problems in this area has accumulated to a certain critical mass and have been exacerbated by a complex legislative tightening the public events regulation.
The main feature of these problems was that the con ict and sometimes just misunderstanding about the rules of holding rallies are not related to the content of the ideas, opinions or calls. The authorities are not following one ideology, they demonstrate practicality, readiness to perceive critical or opposition opinions on a wide range of issues. They demonstrate openness to a variety of ideologically di erent rallies. They also create advisory councils and advisory bodies for consideration of abovementioned critical opinions at a maximum.
Decisions of the Constitutional Court illustrate that tension occurs around the organisational aspects of public actions. This applies to the territory of rallies, the rules for noti cation about a rally or a demonstration, speci c timing and places of their holding, the number of participants, the role and responsibilities of the organisers. It may seem that for the organisers of public events, and for government bodies the technical aspects of rallies rather than ideological ones are of primary importance. For the participants of public rallies the participation is a way of organised and sometimes force or psychological pressure on the ru/en/Info/LegalBases/ConstitutionRF/Pages/Chapter1.aspx.
